We study the consistency strength of Lebesgue measurability for Σ 1 3 sets over a weak set theory in a completely choiceless context. We establish a result analogous to the Solovay-Shelah theorem.
Introduction
The following work is motivated by the results from [HwSh1067] . Assuming ZF C without large cardinals, we constructed a model of ZF where every set of reals is measurable (in a slightly weaker sense) with respect to the ideal derived from a Suslin ccc non-sweet creature forcing (a set of reals is measurable with respect to an ideal I if it equals a Borel set modulo I). As the resulting model doesn't satisfy AC ω , the following questions arise:
1. Given a set theory T that doesn't prove AC ω , a Suslin ccc forcing notion Q and an infinite cardinal κ, is T equiconsistent with T +"Every set of reals is I Q,κ -measurable" (see [HzSh1067] for the definition of I Q,κ )?
2. For T , Q and κ as above, is T + "Every set of reals is I Q,κ -measurable" equiconsistent with T + AC ω + "Every set of reals is I Q,κ -measurable"?
Our main goal is to prove that both of the above questions have a negative answer when T = Z * is a weak set theory that will be defined below, Q is random real forcing and κ = ℵ 0 . As Z * doesn't include the Replacement scheme, we can't prove the existence of a limit uncouontable cardinal in Z * , so the point is that the role of the inaccessible cardinal in the context of ZF C is replaced by an uncountable limit cardinal in the context of Z * C. Our proof will follow the old proofs of Solovay ([So] ) and Shelah ([Sh176] ) on the consistency strength of Σ If A ⊆ R is not 2-null and ≤ is a prewellordering of A such that every initial segment (i.e. {y : y ≤ x}) is 2-null, then there exists a set which is not 3-measurable. Proof: In L [r] there is a sequence (U n , S n : n < ω) such that the sets U n ⊆ [0, 1] are open, the sets S n ⊆ [0, 1] are closed, S n ⊆ C B,a ⊆ U n and L[r] |= "µ(U n \ S n ) < 1 n ". We shall prove that µ(
If in addition
We shall work in L [r] and assume wlog that S n ⊆ S n+1 for every n < ω. Define R as the set of triples (n, s 1 , S) such that: (R) . By absoluteness, the same is true for (R, F ) in V . Now, if s 1 ∈ S n then s 1 ∈ S m for every m > n and {F (m, s 1 ) : n ≤ m} witnesses that s 1 ∈ C B,a . Therefore, V |= "sup{µ(S n ) : n < ω} ≤ µ(C B,a )". Similarly we can show that V |= "µ(C B,a ) ≤ inf {µ(U n ) : n < ω}". 
Proof: Let r be a real such that the definition of B is in L[r], and we shall continue the proof as usual in L [r] . The only point that we have to show is that the above integrals are well-defined and computed in the same way in L [r] and V . For every n > 1 and i ≤ n, let B n,i := {s 1 :
. Let R 1 be the set of sequences (n, i, s 1 , S) such that:
1. n > 1 and i ≤ n.
2. s 1 ∈ S n,i .
3. S ⊆ [0, 1] is closed and
Let X := {(n, i, s 1 ) : i ≤ n, n > 1, s 1 ∈ S n,i } and Y be the set of closed subsets of [0, 1]. As before, by Π 1 1 -uniformization, there is a Π 1 1 -function F 1 ⊆ R such that for every (n, i, s 1 ), if there exists S such that (n, i, s 1 , S) ∈ R 1 , then (n, i, s 1 , F 1 (n, i, s 1 )) ∈ R 1 . By absoluteness, the same is true in V . Similarly, define R 2 as the set of sequences (n, i, s 1 , U) such that:
As before, there is Π 
Proof: In one direction, let a = µ * (A) and ǫ > 0. There is a Borel set
In the other direction, let a = µ * (A), b = µ * (B) and ǫ > 0. There are Borel sets
We are now ready to complete the proof of claim 5.
Without loss of generality A ⊆ [0, 1]. We now define the following sets: 
The following inequalities hold:
Therefore, it suffices to show that µ
where the last inequality follows by the choice of s 1 , the definition of B 2 and the theorem's assumption. By Fubini's theorem, the desired conclusion follows.
The proof for l = 1 is similar, where C B * * 2 ,ǫ 2 is replaced by C ǫ 2 ,B * * 1 and the rest of the arguments are changed accordingly.
Theorem 6: Assume Z * .
If every Σ
1 3 set of reals is 3-measurable, then ℵ L[x] 1 < ℵ 1 for every x ∈ 2 ω , hence ℵ 1 is a limit cardinal in L.
If in addition AC
ω holds, then ℵ 1 is inaccessible in L.
Proof:
We follow a similar argument as in [Sh176] . Assume towards contradiction that ℵ
Case I:
There exists x * * ∈ 2 ω such that B * x * * is not 2-null. Work in V : Denote B = B * x * * and define the following prewellordering on B: x ≤ y iff for every i, y ∈ B * x * * ,<i → x ∈ B * x * * ,<i . Cleary, every initial segment of (B, ≤) has the form B * x * * ,<i , and hence is 2-null. As B is not 2-null, it follows by claim 5 that there exists a non-3-measurable Σ 1 2 -set, a contradiction.
We shall first describe the original stages of the proof in [Sh176] , then we shall describe how to modify the original proof in order to obtain the desired theorem.
The new changes and arguments will be presented in this section, while the proofs from [Sh176] will appear in the appendix.
Outline of [Sh176]:
We fix a rapidly increacing sequence (µ(k) : k < ω) of natural numbers, say, µ(k) = 2 2 2 2 2 176k
.
Step I (existence of a poor man generic tree): Suppose that B ⊆ 2 ω has measure zero, then there are perfect trees
) and:
and for every
, and for every
Step II: Definitions of finite and full systems (see definitions 1-4 in the appendix).
Step III: Showing that the family of finite systems satisfies ccc (claim 5 in the appendix).
Step IV: Forcing with finite systems over
As the existence of a full system is equivalent to the existence of a model to a L ω 1 ,ω (Q) sentence, this is sufficient by absoluteness and Keisler's completeness theorem.
Step V: We use the full system in order to define two Σ 1 3 sets of reals (those are the red and the green sets in [Sh176] ), which will turn out to be non-measurable.
Step VI: Showing that the green and red sets are disjoint, are not null and have outer measure 1, arriving at a contradiction.
Back to the proof of theorem 6:
We shall describe how each of the above steps should be modified in order to obtain the proof of our theorem.
Step I: Claim: The claim in step I of [Sh176] holds when B is a Borel set of measure (say) < 1 1000 . This will be used in order to show that the red and green sets are not 2-null (this is step VI).
Proof: Let r be a real that codes B. The proof is as in [Sh176] , where now we work in L [r] . Observe that the tree T constructed there satisfies lim(T ) ∩ A = ∅ where A is an open set of measure < 1 1000
containing B (and the construction depends only on A).
Steps II-III:
No change is needed.
Step IV: Assuming Z * we can prove Keisler's completeness theorem as well as the forcing theorem in L[r] for every r (see the discussion on forcing over models of Z * in the end of this section). Therefore we can repeat the argument in the original
Step IV.
Step V: No change.
Step VI: We shall freely use the notation and definitions from [Sh176] (see definition 7 and claims 8-11 in the appendix). 
, which is a contradiction.
Claim C:
A rd = {x : φ rd (x)} and A gr = {x : φ gr (X)} are not of measure zero.
Proof: This is the same argument as in claim 10 in the appendix, the only difference is that instead of taking a G δ set of measure zero covering A rd , we take for every 0 < ǫ a Borel set of measure < ǫ covering A rd . By the modified construction of the poor man generic tree, we continue as in the original proof.
Claim D:
A rd is not 3-measurable.
Proof: As in [Sh176] (claim 11 in the appendix).
An upper bound on consistency strength (following Levy)
Historical remark: While Solovay's proof used the collapse of an inaccessible cardinal (which results in a model of DC), our proof follows an older argument of Levy that used the collapse of a limit uncountable cardinal.
Theorem 7:
A → B where:
4. P = Π{P µ,n : µ < λ, n < ω} is a finite support product such that P µ,n = Col(ω, µ).
e. the class of sets in V [G] hereditarily definable from parameters in V and a finite number of members of {η µ,n : µ < λ, n < ω}.
The following claim holds in V 1 : If (a)+(b)+(c) hold then (d) holds where:
a. Q is a defnition of a forcing notion (with elements which are either reals or belong to H(ℵ 1 )) with parameters in V 1 satisfying c.c.c., such that Q is absolute enough in the following sense: There ist * = ((µ i , n i ) : i < n( * )) such that Q is definable usinḡ η t * = {η µ i ,n i : i < n( * )} and parameters from V , and ift = ((µ l , n l ) : 
Remark: Note that P (N)
d. Every X ⊆ ω ω equals a Borel set modulo I.
We shall first outline Solovay's original proof from [So] , then we shall describe how to smilarly prove the above theorem.
An outline of Solovay's proof (for random real forcing)
Step I: Let G ⊆ Coll(ω, < κ) be generic where κ is inaccessible and let
Step II: For every formula φ there is a formula φ * such that for every
Step III:
Step IV:
Q is random real forcing and η ∼ is the name for the generic.
Step V: Given a maximal antichain J ∈ V [a] of closed sets deciding φ * (a, η ∼ ) (where η ∼ is the name for the random real), we define the desired Borel set as union of members of J forcing φ * (a, η ∼ ).
Proof of theorem 7:
Suppose that A ⊆ ω ω is definable usingηt fort = ((µ i , n i ) : i < n). As before, we shall indicate how to modify Solovay's original proof for our purpose.
Step I: Our aim is to prove a result similar to Step I above, where the real parameter belongs to V 1 . Suppose that a ∈ V 1 is a real (so a = a ∼ [G] for some P-name a ∼ ), then a is definable by a formula φ from a finite number of η µ,n 's, say {η µ i ,n i : i < i( * )}. In order to prove that a ∈ V [{η µ i ,n i : i < i( * )}], it's enough to show that:
Claim: If p ∈ P and p a
with q (just switch the relevant coordinates), then π(p) a
In order to complete this step, we shall prove the following claim:
that is the identity over RO(Q).
Proof: Let κ > µ > ℵ 1 + max{µ i : i < i( * )}. As we assume that V = L (so in particular we have GCH), the usual proof works.
Proof: By the above claims, a ∈ V [{η µ i ,n i : i < i( * )}] for an appropriate finite set of η µ i ,n i 's. Let B a be the the complete subalgebra generated by a, then by the previous claim B a × P is isomorphic to P (over B a ) and the claim follows.
Steps II: Same as in Solovay's proof.
We shall use the fact that the ideal I is generated by sets which are disjoint to some
where:
1. N is transitive and ||N|| = ℵ 0 .
B
, it follows by the definition of I that X ∈ I.
Step IV: 
Letp = (p
. By our assumption, given a generic real η we can define the set G η in a Borel way such that:
Now let B := {η : G η is well-defined, satisfies ( * ) above and for some n,
Denote by B n the set of η ∈ B such that "η ∈ B" is witnessed by n.
B is Borel by our assumptions on the forcing. Therefore it's enough to prove that A = B mod I.
(and hence η = η
where G η is as in ( * )), by the definition of {p n : n < ω} and
Similarly, if η ∈ B n for some n such that t n ∼ [G η ] = true, then by the definitions of {p n : n < ω} and (t n ∼ : n < ω), η ∈ A.
Conclusion 8:
A) The following theories are equiconsistent for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
2. Z * C+"there is a strong limit cardinal> ℵ 0 ".
3(i)
. Z * +"every Σ 1 3 set of reals is i-measurable". 4(i). Z * +"every set of reals is i-measurable.
B) The following theories are equiconsistent for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
1. Z * C+"there is a regular limit cardinal< ℵ 0 ".
2. Z * + C+"there is strongly inaccessible cardinal".
3(i). Z * + DC+"every Σ 1 3 set of reals is i-measurable". 4(i). Z * + DC+"every set of reals is i-measurable".
5(i)
. Z * + AC ℵ 0 +"every set of reals is i−measurable".
A remark on forcing over models of Z *
In order to guarantee that the generic extensions in our proofs satisfy Z * , we work in the context of models of Z * of the form L or L[r] for some real r. In this context, we work with classes W of the following form: There is a formula φ with parameters that defines the class, and there is a limit ordinal ν < ω
when α is a limit ordinal (recall that for every ordinal α, the ordinal α + ωn exists). Now, for a set forcing P in a model of the above form, we define the class of P−names as above. Therefore, for every limit ordinal α we define the intersection of L α [r] with the class of names. For the names that we defined, we can prove the forcing theorem as usual and show that Z * holds in the generic extension. In addition, note that when we force over L [r] , as L[r] has a well-ordering < L [r] definable from r, we can use it to get a well-ordering of the generic extension, hence a model of Z * C.
Appendix: Can you take Solovay's inaccessible away? ([Sh176])
We now copy the definitions, theorems and proofs from [Sh176] that are relevant for understanding the above proofs.
The following definitions are presented as step II in the above corresponding proof. Definition 1. 1. Let N n be the set of pairs (t, m) such that:
a. ∅ = t ⊆ 2 ≤n is closed under initial segments, and for every η ∈ t ∩ 2 <n , for some l, η<l >∈ t.
2. Let N = ∪ n<ω N n , we call n the height of (t, m) for (t, m) ∈ N n and denote it by
There is a natural tree structure on N defined by
Definition 2. 1. M k is the set of pairs (t, m) such that for some n = ht(t, m) we have:
a. ∅ = t ⊆ 2 ≤n is closed under initial segments, and for η ∈ t ∩ 2 <n there is l ∈ {0, 1} such that η<l >∈ t.
, and for η ∈ t ∩ 2 <n , m(η) = Σ{m(η<l >) : η<l >∈ t}.
c. We define r l = lev l (t, m) by induction on l: r 0 = 0, r i+1 is the first r > r i such that r ≤ n, for every η ∈ 2 ≤r ∩ t, 4 r+1 m(η) ∈ N, and for every η ∈ 2 r ∩ t,
). Now we demand that r k is well defined and equals n.
4. We define the order on M as we did for N.
Definition 3: A finite (full) system S consists of the following:
A. The common part: A finite subset W ⊆ ω 1 (the set W = ω 1 ) and a number n(1) < ω (n(1) = ω) and a function h :
B. The red part: a. For every (t, m) ∈ M * ,≤n (1) there is a natural number λ(t, m), and for every (t 1 , m 1 ) ∈ N λ (t,m) there is a member ρ(t 1 , m 1 , t, m) ∈ t ∩ 2 ht (t,m) . choices of (l, j, ξ, ζ) . Now recall that lg(η l ) ≤ l, and by the definition of N,
is disjoint to, then by a probabilistic argument,
, it follows that x < 2 k+j+l (2l + 2), so we have at most (2 k+j+l (2l + 2)) 2 probematic pairs of (ξ, ζ) for a given pair of (l, j). Therefore, the number or problematic (l, j, ξ, ζ 
we're done.
The following claim corresponds to step IV in the above proof.
Claim 6. There is a full system in L[x * ].
Proof:
The existence of such a system can be described by a sentence ψ in L ω 1 ,ω , and by Keisler's completeness theorem it's absolute. By the previous claim, forcing with finite systems over L[x * ] preserves ℵ 1 , hence we can get a full system in L[x * ].
The following claim corresponds to step V in the above proof.
Definition 7. Fix a full system S. We define the formulas φ rd (x) and φ ′ rd (x) (and similarly, φ gr (x) and φ ′ gr (x)) as follows:
a. There is a tree T 0 which is a poor man generic tree over L[x * ] (see see clause (A)(2) of step I in the above proof), so there is (n(k) :
b. There is a tree T 1 which is a poor man generic tree over L[x * , T 0 ] (see clause (A)(1) of step I in the aboove proof), so (t n , m n ) = (T 1 ↾ 2 ≤n , ms T 1 ↾ 2 ≤n ) ∈ N n for every n < ω. 2 by x(h(ξ, ζ)) for ξ, ζ < ω 1 . If φ rd (x), there are T 0 , T 1 and (n(k) : k < ω) witnessing it. For j < ω, η l ∈ T 1 and α < ω let A j,l,n be the set of ξ < ω 1 such that T η l ≤ 1 is disjoint to ∪ (η l , j) = α for large enough k. This is a partition of ω 1 to countably many homogeneously red sets. Similarly, from φ gr (x) we get a partition of ω 1 to countably many homogenously green sets, so we get a contradiction. Now suppose that φ rd (x), φ gr (y) and x(n) = y(n) for n > n * . There is a homogenously red set A for x and a homogenously green set B for y such that A ∩ B is uncountable. There is an infinite set {ξ n : n < ω} ⊆ A ∩ B such that h(ξ n 1 , ξ n 2 ) < h(ξ n 2 , ξ n 3 ) has a fixed truth value for n 1 < n 2 < n 3 . By definition 6(A), h(ξ n , ξ n+1 ) is strictly increasing, hence it's > n * for n large enough. Therefore, for n large enough, red = x(h(ξ n , ξ n+1 )) = y(h(ξ n , ξ n+1 )) = green, a contradiction. 
Claim 14:
A rd is not measurable.
Proof: By the previous claim, its measure is not zero. By the definition of φ ′ rd , the measure of {x : φ ′ rd (x), η ≤ x} (η ∈ 2 <ω ) is determined by lg(η). Therefore A rd has outer measure 1, and similarly for A gr . As they're disjoint, we get a contradiction.
